



# TURKISH-JAPANESE JOINT RESEARCH ON MIGRATION

Workshop Report

*Yaşar University UNESCO Chair on International Migration  
Report Series (2)  
May 2020*

TURKISH-JAPANESE  
JOINT RESEARCH ON MIGRATION

WORKSHOP REPORT

Yaşar University, Izmir  
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TURKISH-JAPANESE  
JOINT RESEARCH WORKSHOP ON MIGRATION

PROGRAMME

YAŞAR UNIVERSITY, Senate Room  
FEBRUARY 19, 2019

10:00 – 10:15	<b>Welcome speech</b> Prof.Dr.Aylin GÜNEY, Dean, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences
10:15 - 11:15	Moderator: Prof.Dr.Aylin GÜNEY,  <b>Global Compact on Migration: Who is in, who is out, why?</b> Assoc.Prof.Dr. Ayselin YILDIZ & Assist. Prof. (PhD) Arıkan AÇAR Yaşar University  <b>New Boundary of Japanese Migration Governance</b> Assoc.Prof.Dr.Aiko NISHIKIDA Tokyo University of Foreign Studies  <b>The Filter Function of Border Controls and Refugee's Own Censorship</b> Prof.Dr.Shingo HAMANAKA, Ryukoku University
11:15 - 11:45	Q&A Session
11:45- 12:00	Coffee Break Moderator: Assoc.Prof.Dr.Ayselin YILDIZ
12:00 – 12:45	<b>Do Syrians in Turkey want to return? -analyzing survey to SuTPs (2017)</b> Dr. Yutaka TAKAOKA, Chief Research Fellow, Middle East Institute of Japan  <b>Differences and thinking gaps between men and women of Syrian refugees in Turkey</b> Dr. Kohei IMAI, Research Fellow, Institute of Developing Economies  <b>Migration Governance in Turkey: The Legal and Policy Framework</b> Assist. Prof. (PhD) Elif ÇETİN, Yaşar University
12:45 - 13:00	Q&A Session

### SHORT BIOGRAPHIES

	<p><b>AYSELIN YILDIZ</b></p> <p>Assoc.Prof.Dr. Ayselin YILDIZ is a faculty member of international relations department and UNESCO Chair on International Migration at Yasar University (Izmir/Turkey). Dr. Yildiz received her Phd in international relations and MSc in European Studies from Middle East Technical University. She has been the founder and director of Yasar University European Union Center between 2005 and 2015. She held research fellowships at</p>
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Wageningen University, University of California Berkeley and University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Yıldız has coordinated and engaged in several EU funded projects and held Jean Monnet Module titled “EU Grants and Project Management” (2014-2017). Her research and publications focus on migration and refugee studies, Turkey-EU relations, and external relations of the EU. She is the author of the book *The European Union’s Immigration Policy: Managing Migration in Turkey and Morocco*, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2016. Yıldız is also the committee member at UNESCO Turkey Management of Social Transformations (MOST) and Migration Group.



#### DİLAVER ARIKAN AÇAR

Assist. Prof. (PhD) Açar completed his B.Sc., M.Sc. and Ph.D. at the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University (METU), Turkey. He worked at the same department as research assistant. He did field research in various parts of the Balkans as well as worked for the OSCE missions in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dr. Açar spent a year as Ph.D. research fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London with the Jean Monnet scholarship. After briefly teaching at the Turkish Military College he joined Department of International Relations at the Yaşar University, Turkey as an assistant professor where he currently teaches. There he is also Vice-chair of the Yaşar University Center for Mediterranean Studies. His major areas of interest are foreign policies, Euro-Atlantic integration processes, transition politics and political economy of the Balkan states in general, Albania and Kosovo in particular; small states in world affairs; international peace operations and post-conflict involvements of the international community; international and European security; politics of energy; small wars, insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations and wider Mediterranean politics.



#### AIKO NISHIKIDA

Aiko NISHIKIDA is an Associate Professor (Ph. D) of Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. She is a Head of Japan Center for Middle Eastern Studies (JaCMES) in Beirut, Lebanon and currently doing a research in Germany as a visiting scholar of Berliner Institut für empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (BIM), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Her primarily research topic is Palestinian refugees and investigates their rights and



citizenship. These days she focuses on Arab migrants-refugees in Germany and doing comparative analysis of refugee policy and governance in EU countries and Japan. She gave a lecture titled “Japanese foreign policy to the Middle East: The current policy toward Palestinian-Israeli conflict” at Shanghai International Studies University in 2015, and “API (Arab Peace Initiative) and Japan’s policy toward the Middle East” in Jordan hosted by The Center for Democracy and Community Development and Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development in 2013. She edited a book *Citizenship for Migrants and Refugees: A Comparative Study of Institutions and Practices of Inclusion and Exclusion from Nation-States*, Tokyo: Yushindo-Kobunsha, 2016 (in Japanese) and also published many articles including “Palestinian Migration under the Occupation: Influence of Israeli. democracy and Stratified citizenship,” *Sociology Study*, Vol.3, No.4, 2013 co-authored with Shingo Hamanaka.



SHINGO HAMANAKA

Prof.Dr. Shingo HAMANAKA is a faculty member of the department of Law at Ryukoku University (Kyoto/Japan). His primary research topic is politics of Israel and enduring authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He has been a board member of the Japanese Association of Comparative Politics since 2013. Dr. Hamanaka held research fellowships at Kyoto University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka. He already published over thirty peer-reviewed papers in English and Japanese including "Sensitivity to Casualties in the Battlefield" *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 3(1) 2018, "Demographic Change and its Social and Political Implications in the Middle East" *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 2(1) 2017.



## YUTAKA TAKAOKA

Yutaka is currently senior research fellow at the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, Tokyo since 2014 and also chief research fellow at the same institute. His former positions include;

Political attache, Embassy of Japan in Syria 2000-2003

Visiting Research Fellow, the Middle East Research Institute of Japan 2003-2006

Research Fellow, the Middle East Research Institute of Japan 2006-2008

Research Assistant, Sophia University 2008-2011

Research Fellow, the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, Tokyo, Japan 2011-2014.

He received his Phd and MA from Sophia University in area studies. He is a graduate of Waseda University (1998). His publications include; The Role of Tribes in Contemporary Syrian politics and Society: An Analysis of Tribes in the Euphrates River Region and al-Jazeera Region Tokyo: Sangen-sha 2012 in Japanese.



## KOHEI IMAI

Kohei IMAI is a research fellow of Middle East Studies Group in Area Studies Center of Institute of Developing Economies. He received his BA and MA degrees from Chuo University, concluded his Ph.D. in the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Turkey in 2011 and Graduate School of Law (Major of Political Science) at Chuo University in 2013 (dual Ph.D.). He is the author of several books and articles on Turkish foreign policy and the theory of International Relations including “Turkey’s Norm Diffusion Policies toward the Middle East: Turkey’s Role of Norm Entrepreneur and Norm Transmitter”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol.42, 2012 (in English), Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East: Contributing to the Construction of the Regional Order, Minerva Shobo, 2015 (in Japanese), Contemporary History of Turkey, Chuokoronshinsha, 2017 (in Japanese), The Range and Limit of International Relations Theory, Chuo University Press, 2017 (in Japanese), “Rethinking the Insulator State: Turkey’s border security and the Syrian civil war”, Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 7, No.1, 2017, The Possibility and Limit of Liberal Middle Power Policies: Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East during the AKP Period (2005–2011), Lexington Books, 2017, and “The struggle in governing areas void of sovereignty: The Islamic State and Kurdish Organizations in Iraq and Syria”, Kokusaiseiji



(International Relations), Vol. 194, 2018 (in Japanese). His main research areas are contemporary Turkish foreign policy, international politics of the Middle East, and theory of International Relations.



### ELİF ÇETİN

Assist. Prof. (PhD) Elif Çetin is a member of the Department of International Relations at Yaşar University and a Research Associate at the Von Hügel Institute, St Edmund's College, University of Cambridge where she recently finished a collaborative project on 'The relevance of Catholic social thought and practice in the field of migration and asylum policy in the UK' funded by the Charles Plater Trust. She is among the members of the research team working on the EU funded Horizon2020 project RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond and the first author of the report on the legal and policy framework of migration in Turkey (2011-17). She holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge. She carried out part of her Ph.D. research while being a visiting scholar at the European University Institute (Florence) and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) (Oxford). Previously, Elif was awarded Jean Monnet scholarship and conducted her M.A. at the Department of Political Science, Leiden University (The Netherlands).

Elif's research interests and experience include politicisation of immigration, UK, Italian and Turkish immigration politics, political discourse formation, and development of immigration control policies in Europe. She has supervised and published on European politics, politics of immigration control in the UK and Italy, and populist right-wing parties.

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## **Welcome Speech**

**Prof. Dr. Aylin GÜNEY**

*Dean, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences*

Since 2016, Yaşar University UNESCO Chair on International Migration has been held by Ayselin YILDIZ and actively carrying out academic projects in collaboration with other colleagues working in migration field. Having been a hot topic specifically after the Syrian Civil War, in the recent years, migration has come to be comprehensively studied in the context of Syrian refugees. However, the ongoing workshop is of exclusive importance as it is the first time that we are hosting a Japanese delegation to discuss and work on the matter. I believe, at the end of this workshop, we will learn a lot from each other's experiences and perspectives regarding this issue.

## Global Compact on Migration: Who is in, who is out, why?

*Dilaver Arıkan AÇAR*



“The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)” is defined as the first intergovernmental negotiated and agreed document prepared under the auspices of the United Nations that holistically covers all dimensions of international migration. It was formulated as a multi-stakeholder process in 2016, and adopted by world leaders in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 10 December 2018. The Compact’s comprehensiveness in this process is of crucial significance, as it was harmonized with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The GCM is comprised of 23 objectives, including the procedure for implementation, follow-up and review. It is not a legally binding agreement that intends to impose migration policies on Member States. Rather, it is a framework for international cooperation that re-affirms the principle of state sovereignty. The GCM openly recognizes “*the sovereign right of states to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law*”. Additionally, The Compact does not intend to equip refugees with a new right to choose where to go and when to go, it only re-affirms that migrants should enjoy human rights, independently of their status.

Concisely, the GCM is an international cooperation scheme that addresses issues concerning the world’s millions of people on the move. Its collective structure is based on “*common understanding, shared responsibility and unity of purpose*” concerning migration. It adopts a comprehensive perspective to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration while reducing the



negative impact of irregular migration. By encouraging its signatories to have “*mutual responsibilities*” and respect towards human rights of migrants, the GCM aims to “*mitigate adverse drivers and structural factors*” driving people to leave their country of origin.

In this context, the Compact is based on several guiding principles revolving around a 1) people-centered approach, 2) international cooperation and dialogue, 3) respect for national sovereignty of individual states and their migration policies, 4) respect for the rule of law, human rights and gender-responsiveness, and 5) commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

UNSG António Guterres in his address at the Intergovernmental Conference stated four myths about the GCM that he states flat false.

**Myth #1:** The Compact will allow the United Nations to impose migration policies on Member States, infringing on their sovereignty.

- ✓ GCM is not a treaty and it is not legally binding. It is a framework for international cooperation and reaffirms the principle of State sovereignty.
- ✓ GCM refers to “the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law.”

**Myth #2:** The Compact would establish a new right to migrate allowing everyone to choose where to go and when to go.

- ✓ GCM only reaffirms that migrants should enjoy human rights, and independently of their status.

**Myth #3:** Migration is essentially a movement of people from the South to the global North.

- ✓ South-South migration today is larger than South-to-North migration.

**Myth #4:** Developed countries do not need migration.

- ✓ In the many places where fertility is declining and life expectancy is rising, economies will stagnate and people will suffer without migration.

## Global Compact on Migration: Who is in, who is out, why?

*Ayselin YILDIZ*

Today, it has become more difficult in international relations to negotiate for multilateralism and global cooperation in general. Most of the political leaders nowadays tend to be reluctant to focus on long-term reform and collaboration in world politics. In this context, there have been several countries that rejected the two relevant Global Compacts, one on migration, and the other on refugees. The US delegation, for instance, was present during the GCM negotiations, but they said “No” to the framework as a whole. Australia also declared its intention to keep people on the islands (Manus and Nauru), although it has been an immigration country along with the US, throughout the history. Likewise, authorities in New Zealand stated that migration policy, as being a matter of national sovereignty, should not be governed through UN framework. Slovakia, on the other hand, opposed and rejected to sign the document. Some countries, however, are able to approach the issue quite positively, such as Belgium, since Prime Minister Charles Michel signed the Compact at risk of collapse of his coalition. But why are states against the GCM, in essence? What could be the main reasons for this unfavorable attitude?



*December 10, 2018, Marrakesh.  
Photo credit: Ayselin YILDIZ*

In this context, New Zealand argued that they were not ultimately against it, but they also mentioned that migration is an issue of state's sovereignty and signing it can be perceived as promoting/encouraging migration in general. Another reason was the fear that such a common practice might turn into a binding mechanism via court decisions in future, restricting states' authority on governing their national migration policies. By some countries, it is being addressed as "not an international treaty", but it has the potential to have legal implications in some cases. Concerning the US, the Compact ran the risk of legitimizing irregular migration, as the authorities claimed that dealing with all kinds of migration under the same pact would mean giving the same rights to all without differentiating regular and irregular migrants. Briefly, the approaches of these countries are related with mainly the level of securitization of the migration issue at large. While some countries approach the matter from a human-rights perspective, others are apparently leaning more on controlling their borders and migration policies. At the end of the day, migration is seen as a political issue and provides a conducive environment for today's dominant populist discourses, especially for far-right movements and parties that tend to use the issue as means of policy campaigning.

The Compact ultimately adopts the rights-based approach. For instance, family reunification rights. As Dr. Açar mentioned there are, 27 distinct objectives that spell out 187 actions in total. Therefore, one could argue that the Compact comes with an overloaded normative burden and moral pressure on the shoulders of its signatories. It also touches upon the issue of censorship and freedom of expression, encouraging the termination of public funding or material supports to media outlets that systematically promote intolerance, xenophobia, racism and other forms of discrimination towards migrants. Overall, whereas it is not an international treaty, the GCM has the potential to have legal implications in some cases, and hereby puts moral pressure on the countries concerned. That is why, some people have considered this rights-based, non-binding document as "dead on arrival" and "wishful thinking".

### Against Views on the Compact:

- *"GCM undermines the sovereign right of the United States to enforce our immigration laws and secure our borders"* Trump
- Slovakia does not believe that there is no difference between legal and illegal migration Pellegrini said. *"We consider economic migration illegal, harmful, and a security risk"*
- *"Migration [is] not a human right"* Austria's Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache
- *"Hidden resettlement plan for economic migrants"* AfD
- *"The country that signs the pact, obviously signs a pact with the devil"* Le Pen.

However the history says:



## **New Boundary of Japanese Migration Governance**

**Aiko NISHIKIDA**

The Japanese government does not currently work on a migration policy due to a very limited number of refugees residing in the country. In this context, Japan has few related policies and we thus simply see a basic rejection of migration. For example, people like kitchen workers are not usually welcome in Japan. Only for the exceptional cases, Japan has technical training programs for the people who come to Japan to learn the culture, and offers care service for elderly people. Thus, mostly qualified workers are accepted in line with the already-existing refugee policies. Looking at the numbers of refugees, one could observe that there is an exceptional case only for the Vietnamese, because of the alliance between Japan and the US. Therefore, many refugees from Vietnam are currently located in Japan. There is also another exception for Syrians now, but only a marginal number of them is allowed. After the 2010s, Japan has started to change its attitude in this regard, and the relevant law was altered in order to accept more refugees. Historically, Japan had such regulations since the 1980s, but the country was relatively late compared to other countries. In 1990, a basic alteration was made but it could only partly modified the existing policy. Nowadays, it is nevertheless expected that Japan will accept more refugees in 2019.

In Japan, the number of migrants are extraordinarily low. Until 2017, Japan has only accepted 688 people inside its borders, a number representing all asylum seekers including Syrians. However, this does not mean that there are no foreigners in Japan. There are, but most of them are the Chinese and Koreans, not from other countries. The recent motivation for this new attempt for change is related to Japan's swiftly aging population. Currently, 35% of Japan's population is older than 65, which constitutes a serious problem for its labor market. Upon environmental and nuclear disasters (especially those occurred since 2011), most of the labor force in the country has begun to work at risky environments, and that is also why Japan needs more workers today. In the next five years, the Japanese government plans to admit a maximum number of 345,150 foreigners, and this is expected to be a "one step further" for migration in the country. In parallel to this, a new program was devised to accept more refugees, but the



number of refugees to be accepted is still very low. In five years, 86 refugees came from Thailand to Japan. In 2015, the project accepted refugees from Malaysia and it still goes on. For the acceptance of Syrian refugees, the planned five-year intake is restricted to 150 people.

In a nutshell, it could be inferred that the latest shifts in Japanese policy towards migrants represent a new open window after the great Vietnamese intake, even though the already-existing and projected numbers are still marginal. Such a development could lead to a possible transformation of the perception toward foreigners. At this point, one cannot be fully certain of what this incrementally-changing Japanese policy will actually bring about, as the country has always kept its distance to multiculturalism.

## The Filter Function of Border Controls and Refugee's Own Censorship

Shingo HAMANAKA

Especially after the Syrian Civil War, the 2015 European Refugee Crisis, problems in Rohingya, the immigration wave to the US, the Brexit and other international reactions, the issue of migration has recently come to the attention of the Japanese. There seems to be two extreme images of refugees according to George Borjas. Being an expert on migration and economy, he introduces two categories of migrants from his observations in the US. The first category represents exhausted, uneducated and poor people who are perceived as a “burden” by the US administration and citizens. The problem in this category is thus closely related to adaptation process of the refugees concerned. Officials and nationals tend to see these people as dependent on their welfare system, which eventually lead to chauvinism and social disturbance in the society. The second category refers to educated, ambitious people who, as the Americans think, have the potential to contribute to the national economy and interests. For instance, in his analysis of Indian immigrants residing in the US, Borjas holds that *“the average person in India has less than six years of schooling, but over 70 percent of Indian immigrants in the United States have a college or graduate degree.”* Studies with specific regards to Syrian refugees is on the rise, but there is seemingly no significant change in the social image of Syrian refugees especially in media.


In our research, we tried to demonstrate the socio-political status of Syrians living in Sweden in comparison with those living in countries neighboring Syria. We, in doing so, focused on how Swedish people approach Syrian refugees vis-à-vis other European immigrants. The research question of the study deals with the reason why Sweden was chosen as one of the final destinations, and for which type of Syrian refugees. It is obvious that Sweden is very much popular among host countries for international migration and has absorbed many migrants from both European and non-European countries, and refugees fleeing from armed conflicts.

The Clark, Hatton, and Williamson model, thereafter CHW model, points out four types of the migration costs; (1) personal cost of moving, (2) distance, (3) ceiling of acceptance,

and (4) migration policy. If migrants had their own resources, i.e. comparatively higher skill level than natives and/or asset stock, their skill level and asset stock might depress the migration cost of type 1 and 2 in general, and type 4 in some cases. The CHW model, in short, predicts that immigrants moving to developed countries are comparatively higher skilled persons than those move or stay in the less developed/developing.


First, I draw my first hypothesis from theoretical considerations; Syrian refugees in Europe are comparatively higher skilled persons than their brethren staying in the neighboring countries. Graph 1(a) shows the categorization of Syrian refugees in Jordan according to their employment. It is very difficult for us to measure the skill level of people because there is no commonly acknowledged scientific criteria for such measurement. Therefore, especially poverty rates are specifically consulted and indicated within the scope of business sector. Graph 1(a) thus specifically shows the job types of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The graph indicates that most male refugees are unemployed, irregular worker or laborer, whereas over 80% of women stay at home as housewives.

**Graph 1.** Syrian Refugees in Jordan




Graph 2, on the other hand, shows the distribution of jobs of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey. At this point, one could recognize the pattern is almost the same as the distribution in Jordan. It is seen that the Syrian males in Turkey has a higher ratio of being in the labor force than those in Jordan, but have a relatively lower ratio of being unemployed or irregular worker. On the other hand, figures 1(a) and 1(b) is the representative distribution of types of jobs among the refugees in the neighbor countries of Syria.

**Graph 2. Syrian Refugees in Turkey**




Graph 3. demonstrates Syrian refugees in Sweden; who are employed in both private and public sector, and spread across the whole labor market. Most of the women remain as housewives, but it seems that many of them also manage to find a job in the public or private market or start/continue studying. Overall, one could infer that Syrian refugees in Sweden have much more options in the Swedish job market than their relatives residing in Syria’s Middle Eastern neighbors. Here, the relatively higher presence of the business owners, university students, and professionals employed in the Swedish private or public sector attract attention. Departing from the collected data, one could argue that Syrians residing in Sweden are relatively more educated and skilled compared to their relatives in Turkey, and they hereby contribute more to the economic growth.

**Graph 3.** Syrian Refugees in Sweden




Inquiring the reason why Sweden is a popular destination is also important. In this regard, with studies measuring the attitude towards immigrants and immigration, widely known as “the model of ATII”, scholars have developed a few theories explaining how national perceptions vary in host countries. Among those, Sociotropic Threat Theory predicts negative manner towards migrants speaking different languages or living in different cultures. Another theory provides a mechanism calculating animosity over the assumption that migration, in fact, is a burden on a society’s welfare system. It is called the theory of Welfare Chauvinism. The theory shows a set of different national attitudes varying according to the types of the welfare system. For instance, it expects antagonistic behavior towards migrants and thus strong welfare chauvinism, if the host country had a selective welfare system like public assistance with a severe selective means test. Otherwise, it predicts generous attitude towards migrants and hereby weak chauvinism, if the receiving country had an inclusive welfare system, such as the so-called the Swedish Model. At this point, The Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by the Migration Policy Group is useful to indicate how integrative the EU Member States are towards migrants (see the graph below for level of integration –MIPEX– and selectivity in the EU).

**Graph 4.** Level of Integration and Selectivity in the EU




In our study, the second hypothesis suggests that national attitude towards Syrian refugees are different regardless of the above-mentioned types of the welfare policies implemented in host countries. The European Social Survey conducted a survey based on random experimental questions, each question establishing a different link to other questions in the survey. The first two questions were about the attitude towards the professional and unskilled migrants, and the last two questions were about unskilled labor. The research specifically focused on Sweden and Germany because they have relatively similar economic systems and policies highly comparable to one another and to other European countries (i.e. Denmark). They also share similarities in the ways of selecting migrants, for instance, they evaluate people's ethnic affiliations comprehensively. In Sweden, however, ethnicity is less effective in terms of the country's selection process, since there are already a significant number of Polish or Somalian migrants residing in the country as well.


**Graph 5.** Attitude towards the professional and unskilled migrants, Sweden



**Graph 6.** Attitude towards the professional and unskilled migrants, Germany



**Graph 7.** Attitude towards the professional and unskilled migrants, Denmark



In conclusion, according to the empirically supported two hypotheses mentioned above, one could suggest that educated and skilled Syrian refugees tend to proactively choose Sweden as their host country. This seems to be due to Sweden's generous welfare system that attracts migrants in general.



## Do Syrians in Turkey want to return? Analyzing survey to Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) 2017

Yutaka TAKAOKA

The study at hand is about the interpretation of the “Report of the Syrian Refugee Survey to Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) 2017”. There are three main assumptions that I will interpret according to the related survey. The first assumption relates to whether the migrants in question are “nonqualified” or not. The study has demonstrated that many Syrian refugees/migrants chose their destination by assessing the quality and quantity of their own resources and their cultural or religious orientation. In this sense, it could be said that the choice of destination for these individuals is often based on subjective criteria. Thus, community and culture-oriented tendencies eventually led many Syrians in Turkey to remain there instead of moving to the EU countries. Table 1 (see below) illustrates the literacy rates among respondents in our surveys. Empirically, fewer than 5% of Syrians are illiterate or low literate; however, illiteracy and low literacy rates among Syrians in Turkey are exceptionally high, at 17.1% and 13.8%, respectively—although our results might be skewed by most respondents’ rural origins. Despite some differences at educational level, Syrians in Turkey are in the country mostly because of their subjective decision, and they cannot always be considered as nonqualified. Syrians in each country are equipped with social capital resources for refuge/migration as well as certain attitudes toward his/her acquaintances, culture, and religion that affect their choices of destination.

Table 1. Comparison of illiteracy and low literacy rates among survey respondents

	Jordan (2014)	Sweden (2016)	Syria (2016)	Syria (2017)	Turkey (2017)
Illiteracy (%)	9.9	1.3	1.3	1.5	17.1
Low literacy (%)	3.4	1.7	2.0	2.7	13.8
Total (%)	13.3	4.0	3.3	4.2	30.9

The second assumption investigates whether Syrians in Turkey could willingly return to Syria. It thus aims to explore the link between life satisfaction and the willingness to return. Our surveys, in so doing, asked about the extent of Syrian respondents' satisfaction with their lives in Turkey and their willingness to return to Syria. As Table 2 demonstrates, most of our respondents (40.4%) expressed high levels of satisfaction with life in Turkey. Only some part of SuTPs tend to remain in Turkey.

Table 2. All thing considered, how satisfied are you your life as a whole these days?

	Persons	Percent %
1. Completely	328	40.4
2. Quite	167	20.6
3. Moderately	120	14.8
4. Not very	118	14.5
5. Not at all	68	8.4
DK	11	1.4
Total	812	100.0

However, as Table 3 shows, nearly 60% of our respondents also expressed a firm willingness to return. Such outcome resembles the similar tendency among Syrians in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, indicating that Syrian refugees/migrants in neighboring countries share the same hope of eventually returning to Syria.

Table 3. To what extent do you want to return to Syria?

	Persons	Percent %
1. Very	331	40.8
2. Quite	138	17.0
3. Moderately	117	14.4
4. Not very	49	6.0
5. Not at all	146	18.0
DK	31	3.8
Total	812	100.0

According to Table 4 combining the afore-mentioned data regarding life satisfaction and willingness to return, one could assume that Syrians who are satisfied with their lives might still want to go back to Syria as well.

Table 4. Crosstabs of “All thing considered, how satisfied are you your life as a whole these days?” and “To what extent do you want to return to Syria?”

			To what extent do you want to return to Syria?			Total
			Positive	Moderately	Negative	
All thing considered, how satisfied are you your life as a whole these days?	Satisfied	Person	284	84	118	486
		%	58.4%	17.3%	24.3%	100.0%
	Moderately	Person	62	18	28	108
		%	57.4%	16.7%	25.9%	100.0%
	Not satisfied	Person	115	15	46	176
		%	65.3%	8.5%	36.1%	100.0%
Total		Person	461	117	192	770
		%	59.9%	15.2%	24.9%	100.0%

The third assumption explores the most important factors for voluntary repatriation. In this context, Table 5 displays several important results. First, a considerable part of SuTPs saw “better security and peaceful situation” as the most important factor for their return to Syria. Second, most of our respondents attached importance to the community, as shown by their identification of the presence of family and/or friends as their motivation to repatriate. Third, quite a few of the respondents (20 people) considered “political transition in Syria” the most important factor for their return. In addition to this community-oriented attitude, “religious affiliation” was an important factor in the decision to remain settled in, or migrate from Turkey. Whether the incumbent Syrian regime will remain is not the main obstacle for SuTPs’ return; the relatively small number of responses that highlighted “political transition or regime change” as the primary incentive to repatriate suggests that Syrian refugees/migrants residing abroad might not be active supporters of “Syrian uprising or revolution.” Thus, it is apparent that these respondents are very keen on changing their attitudes toward politics in Syria without substantial measures for reconciliation.

Table 5. The most important factor for return to Syria

	Persons	Percent %
1. Good income	56	6.9
2. Better chances to use your abilities	9	1.1
3. Better chances to develop your abilities	4	0.5
4. Better chances to improve your life	14	1.7
5. Better security and peaceful situation	96	11.8
6. Better welfare policy	9	1.1
7. You have a family /relatives/ friends...	102	12.6
8. Living with your family	60	7.4
9. Culturally familiar to you	16	2
10. Language there is your mother language	24	3
11. Religious affiliation	22	2.7
12. Better education for your children	30	3.7
13. Living cost	6	0.7
14. Political transition in Syria	20	2.5
15. Easier to get citizenship	1	0.1
DK, NA	6	0.7
Missing values	343	42.2
Total	812	100


As this study has demonstrated, SuTPs, as well as Syrian refugees/migrants, determined their destinations in accordance with their resources and orientations. Thus, they were not always driven by the conflict, but rather subjectively decided at a certain stage whether they would continue moving or settle in a specific country. In the end, regardless of the choices they make (return or integration), the fate of policies concerning the Syrian refugees/migrants depends on to what extent officials respect their agency.

# The Perception towards Child Education of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Kohei IMAI

In our study, we conducted a poll survey in seven provinces (Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Mersin, Adana, and Kilis) between October 29th and November 11th, 2017. With this study, we tried to reach a sampling unit consisting of 812 individuals in total. Our poll survey was implemented by Infakto Research Workshop, a company which specializes in quantitative surveys and employs Arabic-speaking face-to-face interviewers, having at least high school degrees.

## Distribution of Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Top 10 Provinces



**Table 1.** Research Sampling

Ranking	Province	Number of Syrians	Number of sampling
1	Istanbul	561,615	190
2	Şanlıurfa	475, 800	160
3	Hatay	443, 837	159
4	Gaziantep	383, 260	152
5	Mersin	208, 334	60
6	Adana	203, 575	64
7	Bursa	148, 178	----
8	İzmir	137, 292	----
9	Kilis	131, 074	27
10	Konya	107, 599	----

In the study, seven provinces are chosen depending on the population of refugees they host. The main aim of our poll survey was to clarify the motivations of movement to other countries and return to Syria, as well as conditions in Turkey. Professor Murat Erdoğan at Turkish German University also carried out another poll survey regarding living conditions of Syrians in Turkey. His survey sampled 348 individuals in camps and 887 outside the camps. When we look at the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 2015, Turkey scores at the bottom on the list, concerning its immigration policy (38th out of 38 countries).

## MIPEX 2015 (Turkey)

<http://www.mipex.eu/turkey>



On the other hand, when respondents are asked which factors specifically affect their willingness to stay in a country or migrate to another country (in a multiple-answer survey), it has been revealed that education and income are amongst the most important concerns for them. In this light, our research question arises from this puzzle: Although MIPEX ranks are very low, why Syrian refugees in Turkey attach importance to education for children, and income? We know that Syrian refugees who came to Turkey before the summer of 2015 had the chance to go to EU countries. In addition, Turkey's integration policy is still a work in progress. Syrian refugees in Turkey are rather under "temporary protection".

Factors	Average of multiple answers	Average of single answer
Better security and peaceful situation	41.5%	8.9%
Better education for your children	41.0%	5.7%
Good income	40.8%	14.8%
Living with your family	38.4%	6.9%
Living cost	36.3%	3.3%

Official language of education in Turkey is Turkish. For this reason, most Syrians face difficulties to access education in the country. According to our poll survey, the proportion of Syrian refugees who can speak Turkish is 39.9%. It has also been found in our survey that although Syrian children who acquired the right to temporary protection in Turkey can legally access the Turkish educational system since 2014, almost 62% of the Syrians at school age could not attend any classes in Turkey so far. According to our research, Syrians who once hoped to enroll their children to higher education programs in Syria are also less likely to have such expectations in Turkey. Our survey additionally indicates that the ratio of men and women in terms of education levels is respectively 60% to 40%.

Overall, Syrians consider Turkey as a safe place, but our poll survey also clarifies the huge gap between expectations and experiences of Syrians regarding living conditions in Turkey. In this year, we are planning to have another survey in Turkey targeting Syrians with an intention to return Syria. Recently, approximately 300,000 people have begun to go back to Syria but according to the numbers announced by the UNHCR, there are still people coming from Syria as well, and their number is increasing.



## Migration Governance in Turkey

Elif ÇETİN

Turkey emerged as a significant country for migration within the context of the Syrian conflict. The number of Syrians in Turkey is now around 3.5 million. The Mediterranean Peninsula is active, and people are usually on the move. In this context, Turkey is relatively a new player in terms of its efforts in the legal framework. With its temporary protection regulations devised after 2014, a new state agency, namely Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), was established to carry out activities in the field. This was a significant development also in international law, in which legal documents clarify different categories of migrants. Therefore, a better questioning of “who should be granted access” is significant to underline the duality between the EU and non-EU asylum seekers. In Turkey, whereas the first group can obtain the refugee status, the second group can only obtain temporary refugee status, because Turkey’s policy of geographical reservation. Those who are granted temporary protection are only Syrians. There are different types of permits in this regard; short-term residence permit, family residence permit, student residence permit, etc. According to law, a person can also work in a part-time job with a long-term residence permit. Humanitarian residence permit and victim of a human trafficking residence permit are for 30 days. With time, human trafficking residence permit allows them to break the impact of their highly traumatic experiences, give them time to recover, and they can be renewed for 6 months period. These permits can also be renewed up to 3 years if the individual in question is willing to remain in Turkey.

There are different international protection statuses. In addition to granting refugee status, there are also options such as subsidiary protection and temporary protection (i.e. Syrians in Turkey). According to UNCHR, more than 3000 people of different nationalities have international protection, such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, and Somalians. In this context, the number of issued residence permits has been gradually growing since 2015. Amongst them, the short-term residence permit ranks at the top, which is followed by family, student, work, and other types of permits.



Comparing with the other Southern countries, one could argue that migrants contribute to the Turkish economy even without the work permit. The increasing number of people who are under temporary protection has also created peculiarities concerning the provision of basic services. Because, only the Syrians who are registered in Turkey could benefit from such services. Legal documents clearly distinguish between

regular and irregular migration, where the latter is associated with asylum regulations. Prior to this, nothing was mentioned in the domestic law, and especially the law on foreigners did not provide any principles regarding international protection. When it comes to how courts are dealing with the issue, it can be said that there is a lack of specialized immigration or asylum specialists in Turkey. Current asylum system in Turkey is quite new and thus national courts do not have enough experience on the matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior are the mainly and extensively authorized institutions in the field.

AFAD, established in 2009, has also played a role in the process. Although it was formed as an institution essentially for emergencies mostly in the times of natural disasters, it has gradually become responsible for the coordination of assistance abroad. In 2011, its role has changed and its functions have been re-defined in a way to cover migration-induced human needs.

## Question & Answer Session

### **1- Departing from the numbers that you (Aiko Nishikida) shared, how can you explain the Japanese approach in migration governance?**

In general, foreigners are not usually welcome to come and stay in Japan, especially after the World War II. The reasons for this are mainly economic and cultural, but specifically difficult to recall. It seems that many legal changes are required, but the Japanese government is still reluctant to do so. This is mainly due to the very limited number of foreigners and refugees residing in the country. However, the population is shrinking and the need for nonqualified labor and care work are lately on the rise. Therefore, the Japanese society will probably start to attract labor mainly from Europe and Asia; specifically Philippines and Thailand.

### **2- Do you think that there might be some changes in the future? (Asked to Aiko Nishikida)**

Not drastically, but yes. I personally heard that Japan is not considered as a very attractive market for workers. Many people prefer South Korea and Taiwan instead. So, Japan has started accepting people but it was quite late.

### **3- How about the media, is it considered as a supportive actor? (Asked to Aiko Nishikida)**

After the legal changes, there have been many podcasts about it, but the current public opinion shows that at least half of the Japanese population is against migration. In general, whereas the right wing sounds worried, leftists seem to be more prone to political change. In other words, skeptics in the Japanese society mainly associate migration with social change, and that seems to be what they fear the most. Nationalists occasionally argue that the country should mainly focus on foreign-worker intake, rather than migration.

**4- Your presentation does not directly refer to constructivism in particular. It is true that many nation-states has started to welcome new ideas in the field, but what is your personal opinion on this? How could ideas contribute to our understanding of migration in general?** (asked to Ayselin Yıldız)

Actually, the current context is more likely to be explained by neorealism. I propose a long-term perspective for the Compact. If the Compact is given as the reference point by some court decisions, it might become a part of the norm. It depends on how we will be able to challenge the mainstreamed anti-discourses, de-construct them. Furthermore, the 1951 Convention is outdated, it also needs to be improved in line with the current needs of the international society, humanity. At this point, international cooperation should be encouraged and recognized as the key principle. From a liberal point of view, any step towards cooperation could be considered as a progressive one, since under these circumstances it seems impossible to have a binding document.

**5- Is there any ‘international mission’ for Japan in the field of migration? If so, what are the ongoing projects of the country? What is, in general, Japan’s role in the international community?** (asked to Japanese Scholars)

Japan is now carrying out projects especially in Palestine and Syria. In Palestine, we have a governmental project to promote education. In Syria, vast infrastructural projects are underway, specifically for the construction of railways. In this sense, the country’s approach resembles the European one; “pay for their peace instead of welcoming them”.

**6- Looking at Turkey’s migration policy, one could argue that ethnicity is historically important for the country’s approach to migration. Do you agree?** (asked to Ayselin Yıldız)

With the new law, it is no longer the case. There are no criteria addressing the ethnic origin in Turkey’s recent law on migration. However, of course Turkey’s historical experience with migration in terms of comparing ethnic identities of incoming people matters. This comparison exists in the public opinion and mainly affects the perceptions among Turkish society with regards to integration issues. For example, people compares Turkish origin migrants from Bulgaria with Syrians. Any other ethnicity might be seen

as a threat to cultural, national unity. This perception is highly influenced by historical experience.

**7- In Turkey, political parties do not often use a discriminatory rhetoric concerning migration and embrace harshly populist discourses. In Eastern Europe, securitization in this regard is becoming very popular. Why such political jargon is not prevalent in Turkey, despite some discontents in the public arena? (asked to Elif Çetin)**

There is no anti-immigrant party in Turkey yet. The political discussion of migration, specifically regarding Syrians, is quite new. The Turkish case, at this point, might have some peculiarities compared to how the recent talk on migration started and developed in Europe. For such securitization is inherently a very dynamic process

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**The presentations of the workshop are available at:**

<https://unescochair.yasar.edu.tr/workshop-3/?csrt=4512682786957032372>

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## Yaşar Univesity UNESCO Chair on International Migration

Yaşar Univesity UNESCO Chair on International Migration aims to promote an integrated system of research, training, information and documentation on “international migration”. It seeks to establish and consolidate the dialogue between researchers, policy-makers, local communities and civil society working on migration issues. Accordingly, the Chair functions to create and maintain an interdisciplinary cooperation platform to ensure the sharing of knowledge, experience and good practices, to help strengthen institutional capacities, as well as to encourage further teaching and research.

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